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“Now, gods, stand up for bastards!”
No, this is not the prayer of the New York litigator; it is the battle cry of Edmund, bastard son of the Earl
of Gloucester and one of the great early modern theorists of political legitimacy. Edmund is scheming to
usurp the earldom with the invention of a forged letter that frames the legitimate heir, his half-brother
Edgar. Edmund’s political philosophy is laid out in his first soliloquy in King Lear, which I quote below
in its entirety. Why I believe Edmund to be a great theorist of legitimacy will become more clear over time:
Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit
The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moon-shines
Lag of a brother?  Why bastard?  Wherefore base?
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous, and my shape as true,
As honest madam’s issue?  Why brand they us
With base?  With bastardy? Base, base?
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature, take
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed,
Go to the creating a whole tribe of fops,
Got ‘tween asleep and wake? Well, then,
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land:
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund
As to the legitimate: fine word, legitimate!
Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed,
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base
Shall top the legitimate. I grow; I prosper:
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! 1
Edmund’s case has been partially conceded by Gloucester, who has already told us that he is quite dis-
posed to recognize Edmund. He’s fond of the lad: “Tho this knave came something saucily to the world
before he was sent for, yet was his mother fair, there was good sport in his making, and the whoreson
must be acknowledg’d.”2 Though Edmund lacks one kind of pedigree, Gloucester grants that the cir-
cumstances of his creation confer upon him standing of another sort. Edmund has a point.
I .  FROM KOSOVO TO PALM BEACH COUNTY
We’ll return to Edmund and his theory of legitimacy in a moment, but first consider a contemporary puz-
zle about legitimacy that comes about when we juxtapose responses to the 1999 NATO intervention in
Kosovo and responses to the 2000 U.S. presidential election. To understand the piece of the puzzle posed
by Kosovo, we have to back up a bit to the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 and what I’m going to sarcastically
call the Srebrenica Doctrine. Srebrenica was a United Nations “safe area” that proved insufficiently safe
for the 7,000 or so Bosnian Muslim men who were led to their slaughter under the supposed protection
of a Dutch peacekeeping battalion. There were a lot of negligent mistakes made around Srebrenica, and
arguably there was some cold-hearted political strategy that led to the fall and the slaughter as well. But
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Srebrenica happened in part because U.N. officials were in the grip of an idea, the Srebrenica Doctrine,
which has three prongs: immunity, neutrality, and multilateralism. In order to respect the sovereignty of
nations and the immunity from interference that supposedly follows, the humanitarian intervener must
avoid two sorts of partisanship: taking sides in a conflict, and acting on one’s own.
To insure neutrality and multilateralism, multiple parties held the keys needed to unfetter would-be res-
cuers. The Bosnian Muslims were prevented from arming and defending themselves, lest the peace-
keepers be seen as taking sides among armed combatants. Once the Serbian encroachment began, the
besieged U.N. peacekeepers were repeatedly instructed to give ground rather than fight back. The NATO
fighter pilots who, after days of delay, eventually flew overhead and could have routed the Serbs rather
easily, were hampered by rules of engagement that permitted only close air support in defense of the
peacekeepers themselves, not the unarmed civilians the Dutch battalion was there to protect. To save
Srebrenica from slaughter, too many people had to turn their keys, and though the military commander
holding the NATO key was prepared to turn it, the diplobureaucrat holding the U.N. key was not.3 To
counterattack Serb forces would violate the neutrality that the Srebrenica Doctrine maintained was a
requirement of international law. 
In the aftermath of Srebrenica comes the NATO intervention in Kosovo, a ten-week bombing campaign
aimed at driving Serb-dominated Yugoslav forces out of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo in order to end
the persecution of the ethnic Albanians. Whatever one thinks about the moral case for intervening in
Kosovo, one is hard-pressed to make a legal case. Military intervention that takes sides in an internal
struggle within a sovereign nation appears to be a straightforward violation of the U.N. Charter, and so
of international law. The illegality of the intervention was recognized by the independent international
commission on Kosovo chaired by Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
and Chief Prosecutor of the U.N. International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  So the
commission’s report uncouples the concept of legality from legitimacy: “Experience from the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo suggests the need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy.”4 There is a gap.
“The intervention was not legal because it contravened the Charter prohibition on the unauthorized 
use of force.”5 Straightforwardly, in violating the U.N. Charter, the intervention was illegal.6 Nonetheless, 
… the question of whether the intervention was legitimate has to be answered, especially since
Kosovo may provide a precedent for further intervention in the future. The Commission’s
answer has been that the intervention was legitimate, but not legal, given existing interna-
tional law. It was legitimate because it was unavoidable: diplomatic options had been
exhausted, and two sides were bent on a conflict which threatened to wreak humanitarian
catastrophe and generate instability through the Balkan peninsula.7
The Goldstone report drives a wedge between legitimacy and legality, and goes on to offer an argument
why, though illegal, the interveners still had proper legitimate authority. Gloucester’s whoreson doesn’t
simply take lawfulness as the standard. “Wherefore should I/stand in the plague of custom and per-
mit/the curiosity of nations to deprive me?/… When my dimensions are as well compact,/My mind as
generous, and my shape as true,/As honest madam’s issue?” Edmund offers a substantive standard for
the proper exercise of power whether or not it comports with the curious customs of conventional law. So
too, the Kosovo Commission: in its view, a wedge can be driven between legality and legitimacy, and the
Kosovo intervention, though illegal, was nonetheless legitimate. 
Now consider the same wedge turned around. The example takes us to the arithmetically challenged state
of Florida after the 2000 presidential election. A couple of days after the final Supreme Court decision
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that gave the presidency to George W. Bush, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt was interviewed
on “Meet the Press.” After a rather lengthy exchange in which the interviewer is trying hard to get
Gephardt to concede that George W. Bush is legitimate, the interviewer asks,  
“So George W. Bush is the legitimate forty-third president of the United States?” 
Gephardt answers: “George W. Bush is the next President of the United States.”  
Question: “But is he legitimate?”
Answer: “We have to respect the presidency, we have to respect the law, and we have to work
with him to try to solve the people’s problems.” 8
In both cases, we see commentators claiming that legitimacy
and legality can come apart. The Kosovo intervention, though
illegal, was legitimate, and the Bush presidency, though legal, is
illegitimate. Edmund drives yet another wedge, between legiti-
macy and pedigree, and challenges the idea that the criteria of
legitimacy are procedural, not substantive. Look at me! My
dimensions are as well compact, my mind as generous, and my
shape as true. What is this idea of legitimacy, that it can be used
in these sorts of ways?  Can legality, pedigree, and legitimacy
indeed come apart?
To answer, we need to make two distinctions. The first is the dis-
tinction between descriptive legitimacy—the social fact that people believe some person or institution has
the moral right to rule—and normative legitimacy—genuinely having the moral right to rule. These are
two different notions, and we need to be clear about when we’re using one, when we’re using the other,
and what, if anything, connects the two.
The other distinction is between the word legitimacy, the concept or idea of legitimacy, and particular 
conceptions of legitimacy—the content of the concept. “Fine word, legitimate!” Edmund says with irony.
It is a fine word, but we need to trace its changing senses over time to distinguish the word from the idea
or ideas it expresses. The same word, of course, can come to refer to different concepts—a “civil right”
is not a polite uppercut to the jaw—and different words—“authority” is the closest cousin here—can
refer to the same concept. I have, a moment ago, offered a rough account of the concept by saying that
legitimacy is the moral right to rule, but if we understand conceptual analysis as the exercise of marking
off apt boundaries for fruitful argument so that we neither talk past each other nor beg the question, we
may discover that this rough draft needs some editing. Finally, the concept or idea of legitimacy can be
filled out in different ways. We can both agree that we are talking about the same idea, legitimacy, but dis-
agree about its content: criteria for how you get legitimacy and what it gets you.
I I .  DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE LEGIT IMACY
Contemporary political usage of legitimacy often is ambiguous or confused. Consider the U.S. Supreme
Court opinions surrounding Bush v Gore. Here is the dissent of Justice Stevens from the stay that tem-
porarily stopped the Florida recount while its legality was being adjudicated: 
“The first [distinction] is [that] between
descriptive legitimacy— the social fact
that people believe some person or
institution has the moral right to rule—
and normative legitimacy—genuinely
having the moral right to rule.”
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It is clear, however, that a stay should not be granted unless an applicant makes a substan-
tial showing of a likelihood of irreparable harm. In this case, applicants have failed to carry
that heavy burden. Counting every legally cast vote cannot constitute irreparable harm. On
the other hand, there is a danger that a stay may cause irreparable harm to the respondents—
and, more importantly, the public at large—because of the risk that “the entry of the stay
would be tantamount to a decision on the merits in favor of the applicants.” … Preventing the
recount from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on the legitimacy of the election.9
Does Stevens mean that preventing the recount will cloud our perceptions of legitimacy, so that we will
hold mistaken or uncertain beliefs about who has the genuine right to rule, or does Stevens mean that
thinking makes it so, and the cloud will threaten the genuine legitimacy, the genuine moral right to rule,
of the purported winner?
Justice Scalia, responding to Stevens, clearly understands Stevens to be making a point about perceptions:
The issue is not, as the dissent puts it, whether “[c]ounting every legally cast vote ca[n] 
constitute irreparable harm.” One of the principal issues in the appeal we have accepted
is precisely whether the votes that have been ordered to be counted are, under a reasonable
interpretation of Florida law, “legally cast vote[s].” The counting of votes that are of 
questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the
country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election. Count
first, and rule upon legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that
have the public acceptance democratic stability requires.10
Of course counting legal votes causes no irreparable harm, but counting votes of questionable legality
can, and this is so even if they are ultimately ruled to be illegal. How?  By casting a cloud on Bush’s claim
of legitimacy, not on his legitimacy itself. As I read Scalia, you either have or don’t have legitimacy regard-
less of what people think you have. Irreparable harm comes if a cloud is cast over the truth, and the pub-
lic fails to accept Bush’s genuinely legitimate rule. Scalia recognizes the gap between descriptive and
normative legitimacy. Count first and rule on legality afterwards is a recipe for perceived illegitimacy, but
not for genuine illegitimacy. Though the court was divided about the effects of the recount on perceptions
of legitimacy, it agreed that legitimacy and perceptions of legitimacy are separable ideas—or so it seems.
But now consider Justice Breyer’s understanding of legitimacy in his dissent from the final decision that
gave the presidency to Bush. Breyer is commenting on the disputed Electoral College count in the Hayes-
Tilden presidential election of 1876, which was decided by an ad hoc election commission appointed by
Congress made up of five Senators, five Congressmen, and five Supreme Court justices. The commission
split along partisan lines, and Justice Bradley cast the deciding vote for Hayes, apparently on technical,
apolitical grounds:
The relevance of this history lies in the fact that the participation in the work of the elec-
toral commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process legit-
imacy. Nor did it assure the public the process had worked fairly guided by the law. Rather,
it simply embroiled members of the Court in partisan conflict thereby undermining respect
for the judicial process.11
On Breyer’s telling, several Supreme Court justices who had genuine legitimacy on their bench tried but
failed to lend this property to a new, ad hoc deliberative body, the election commission. Why would one
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think that this lending could succeed, and why did it fail?  We can’t be sure, but Breyer here apparently
holds that thinking does make it so, and genuine legitimacy just is perceived legitimacy. If enough peo-
ple had believed that Justice Bradley, respected and authoritative in his own domain, was acting with
proper warrant in this new domain, then the legitimacy of the Supreme Court would have been success-
fully borrowed by the election commission. But as it turns out, enough people didn’t believe this.
Many press accounts of Florida’s election controversy either fail
to differentiate normative and descriptive legitimacy or else
implicitly suppose that normative legitimacy just is descriptive
legitimacy. Consider this Los Angeles Times headline: “Bush Has
Legitimacy, But It’s Fragile.”12 Pause a moment and guess what
sort of story would generate such a lead.…The story reports the
findings of a poll taken shortly after the Supreme Court ruling, in
which 52% answered “Yes” to the following question: “Did Bush
win the election legitimately?” He’s legitimate, because a majori-
ty says he is, but his legitimacy is fragile, because it’s a narrow
majority. What Bush has is legitimacy—presumably, the gen-
uine article. He has it, not because he received more valid votes
than Gore in Florida, or because Bush v Gore was correctly decided, or because Supreme Court decisions
have moral authority even when mistakenly decided. He has genuine legitimacy because 52% believe that he
received more valid votes or believe the case was correctly decided or believe that even mistaken courts are
authoritative—even if these beliefs are false. Should 3% of the public change their minds—influenced by
some fine point about statistical sampling, perhaps, or by a law review article on federalism, or by a politi-
cal philosophy paper—this fragile legitimacy would crumble, and Bush would revert to a bastard president. 
This conflation of legitimacy itself and beliefs about it—between the normative and the descriptive—has
its start in the social theory of Max Weber.  I don’t think that Weber himself suffers from this conflation:
it is fairly clear that his account of legitimacy is an exercise in descriptive social science, not normative
political philosophy, and the object of description is the social fact that people have beliefs about the nor-
mative grounds of legitimacy:
But custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a
sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination [Herrschaft]. In addition there is normally
a further element, the belief in legitimacy [der Legitimitätsglaube]. Experience shows that in
no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or
ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to estab-
lish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. 13
Famously, Weber describes three pure types of grounds claimed by rulers to cultivate belief in their legit-
imacy: rational-legal grounds, traditional grounds, and charismatic grounds. But he takes a shortcut,
drops the repeated reference to beliefs about legitimacy, and simply labels these grounds pure types of
“legitimate domination”  [legitime Herrschaft]. 14
After Weber, “legitimacy” enters into the lexicon of social science as a descriptive term with unexamined
normative entailments. This has had two unfortunate consequences. Either the full-throated normative
question about whether a ruler has genuine moral legitimacy becomes difficult to articulate, or—
worse—the normative question is thought to be answered directly by empirical observation, so that legit-
imate rule just is rule believed to be legitimate.
“Many press accounts of Florida’s 
election controversy either fail to 
differentiate normative and descriptive
legitimacy or else implicitly suppose
that normative legitimacy just is
descriptive legitimacy.”
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But it is a conceptual confusion to hold that “legitimate” simply means “believed to be legitimate,” for
descriptive legitimacy is parasitic on the conceptually prior idea of normative legitimacy.  What is sup-
posed to be the content of these beliefs about legitimacy?  Consider: when the objects of this social sci-
entific description, the members of some political society, believe that a rule or a ruler is legitimate, they
are not (or not simply) engaging in their own social scientific description of each other’s beliefs. If that
were so, when the citizens polled by the Los Angeles Times were asked
“Is Bush legitimate?” each would have to answer “I don’t yet know—
I haven’t seen the results of this poll.”  What descriptive legitimacy
describes are views about normative legitimacy. (This is so, by the
way, even if normative legitimacy does not exist, which would be the
case if various forms of moral skepticism or anarchism were true.
Unicorns do not exist either, but the idea of a unicorn does, and
therefore one’s beliefs about what a unicorn is can be mistaken.)
This is not to assert that the social fact of what people take to be
morally legitimate cannot figure in as a condition for having moral
legitimacy. It is not incoherent to hold that an authority is morally legitimate if and only if most people (for
whatever reason) believe that that authority is morally legitimate. But note that this is a claim about the nor-
mative criteria for having moral legitimacy—a particular conception—and not a claim about the meaning
of moral legitimacy, which is conceptually more primitive than social facts about beliefs about it. Though
not incoherent, such a claim is mistaken. In most cultures over most of history, women have believed that
their husbands had legitimate authority over them, but that didn’t make it so. Similarly, the fact that peo-
ple in a society believe that their rulers have legitimate authority, or the fact that the rulers of other soci-
eties believe that the rulers of the society in question have legitimate authority, doesn’t make it so. 
Furthermore, it does seem that a conception of normative legitimacy that is wholly a function of beliefs
about legitimacy fails the test of transparency, in that it depends on some people holding a different con-
ception. Suppose a two-member polity is subjected to the rule of an outside ruler. Both members believe
that the correct conception of legitimacy is that the ruler is genuinely legitimate just in case the other
believes the ruler to be legitimate, and illegitimate just in case the other believes the ruler to be illegiti-
mate. Neither has beliefs about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ruler, nothing else counts for or
against legitimacy, and it is common knowledge between the two that this is their conception. Then there
are two stable normative equilibria, legitimacy and illegitimacy, and this is so because there are two sta-
ble epistemic equilibria: both members’ believing the ruler to be legitimate and both believing the ruler
to be illegitimate.  But there are no grounds whatsoever for choosing between the two equilibria. As spec-
ified, neither the members nor their conception can deliver an answer to the question “Is this ruler legit-
imate or illegitimate?”  
This result generalizes to the N-person case in which the conception of legitimacy that everyone holds is
that the ruler is legitimate if and only if n or greater out of N persons believe the ruler to be legitimate,
for n greater than 0 and less than N. To tip one way or another, there need to be exogenous beliefs about
legitimacy or exogenous presumptions in favor of inferring beliefs in legitimacy that are precluded by the
theory. For even if we suppose that each member of this society subscribes to the general conception that
genuine legitimacy is wholly a function of beliefs about legitimacy, but they hold varying specific values
for the critical threshold n, ranging from the minimal threshold of n = 1 up to the demanding threshold
of n = N-1, the cascade that will bring about unanimous justified belief in legitimacy (or, symmetrically,
illegitimacy) cannot get started unless one person believes that the ruler is legitimate (or illegitimate). But
this cannot happen if all form beliefs about legitimacy in accordance with their conception: the cascade
“It is not incoherent to hold that an
authority is morally legitimate if
and only if most people (for what-
ever reason) believe that that
authority is morally legitimate.”
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depends on someone believing in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ruler on different grounds, or on
making a mistake in inference about the beliefs of others.
In some games with multiple equilibria, aren’t some strategies dominant? Yes, but this is not a game of
strategy, in which players choose actions to their rational advantage. What to believe here is given by one’s
normative theory, and is not a matter of choice. Pascal’s wager notwithstanding, a rational person cannot
choose to believe. One can choose to consent, and on a normative account of legitimacy in which only con-
sent matters, with the added assumption that it is to the rational advantage of each (or, on Kant’s view,
the duty of each) to live under legitimate rule, choosing to consent and thereby making the ruler legiti-
mate is indeed a dominant strategy. But now consent, and not belief in legitimacy, is doing the work. 
The appeal of taking perceived legitimacy as a sufficient condition for genuine legitimacy may arise from
conflating perceived legitimacy with consent. An obvious way that belief in legitimacy and consent can
come apart is when the belief has been fraudulently manufactured. If I agree to be governed by the win-
ner of an election who actually stuffed the ballot boxes, or if I agree to be governed by God’s prophet who
actually is a con artist, I have not genuinely consented.  Perceived legitimacy and consent also can come
apart in a deeper way. I can believe that a government has the right to govern us without our consent with-
out that belief itself constituting consent. When the bastard Edmund’s nonfictional contemporary, James
I of England, argued for the divine right of kings, he explicitly denied that the legitimacy of his power
depended on any sort of consent. Now imagine you are an English subject taught to believe that the king
is God’s lieutenant on earth, answerable to God alone.15 You chafe at James’s violations of his subjects’ lib-
erties, and have the mischievous thought that if your consent mattered, you would not grant it, but, alas,
you believe that consent doesn’t matter. I think it odd to say of a person whose belief in the legitimacy of a
ruler depends on the belief that human volition is irrelevant to legitimacy has consented to be ruled. 
More plausibly, descriptive legitimacy might be a necessary but not sufficient condition of normative
legitimacy. This would be so if some measure of effectiveness were a condition for the justified exercise
of coercive control, and the perception of justification were necessary for effectiveness. 
Rather than Weber, we should return to the usage of Rousseau. When Rousseau in the opening lines of
The Social Contract famously writes, “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.… How did this
change occur?  I do not know. What can make it legitimate [légitime]?  I believe I can answer this question,”
he is using legitimacy in the full-throated normative sense, a sense that is both historically and conceptu-
ally prior to Weber’s.16 For Rousseau, legitimacy does not simply mean the social fact of legality. What are
our chains, if not existing legal and political institutions?  Though everywhere we are under law, the legit-
imacy of such law for Rousseau is an open question, not a tautology. Again, one can make the substantive
moral argument that the social fact of valid law is a necessary and sufficient condition for legitimate law,
but this is a substantive claim, not an analytic definition. For Rousseau, legitimate doesn’t simply mean
legal. Henceforth, when I refer to legitimacy unmodified, I mean normative, not descriptive, legitimacy.
I I I .  WORD,  CONCEPT,  AND CONCEPTION
Let us now turn to the second set of distinctions: the word “legitimacy”—the concept or idea of legiti-
macy—and particular conceptions of legitimacy—the content of the concept. I’ll begin by making an 
elementary and obvious point about words and concepts that has, in our case, an insufficiently appreci-
ated implication. Take the word “bank.” You say a bank is a good place to put your money, and I say not
unless you like your dollars soggy. You mean the financial institution and I mean the side of a river,
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and we do not have a real disagreement between us. As with the polite boxer’s “civil right,” we are
using the same word to refer to two different concepts, and so we are talking past each other. What
conceptual analysis does is help figure out when we are having a real disagreement and when we are
just talking past each other. 
With banks, however, there is an etymological twist. Bank first means a
raised mound of earth, as in a riverbank. By analogy, the word comes also
to mean a long platform, table, or raised set of stalls—what looks like a
riverbank. From there, we get the stalls or the tables of money-changers,
eventually followed by the financial institutions we call banks. So river-
banks and money banks have a common linguistic history. We might
imagine some simple soul shlepping along, as etymological baggage, the
idea that banks have to have something to do with raised mounds. He
might think that, to really be a bank, there must be a teller behind a count-
er, and somewhere in the basement vault there must be a raised mound
of money.  An Internet site whose deposits are simply entries in a database cannot be a bank. That, he says,
is a conceptual error. This is of course foolish. Perhaps a substantive argument can be mounted in defense
of tellers and gold deposits, but it will not be an argument about the proper meaning of the word “bank.”
The word “legitimacy” also comes with baggage, and if we want conceptual clarity, we had better pack
lightly. The connection between actual political rule and rightful political rule has of course always been
a central question in political philosophy, and one that takes on a special urgency during the religious
strife of the early modern period, when so much of our current political vocabulary is shaped. But “legit-
imate” and “illegitimate” as the normative terms of art that characterize this connection arrive late on the
scene, and, because of earlier uses, nearly always present problems of interpretation. The Latin root—
lex—and various cognates— legislator, legitimus—all initially refer simply to law and legality. Over time,
legitimacy comes to mean as well a normative property that law can have or fail to have, so that by the
time Rousseau writes, the open normative question of the legitimacy of law can be posed in so many
words. To be clear: the question was never unaskable; what begins to happen around the French Wars of
Religion and is firmly in place by Rousseau’s time is that the question is askable in so many words.
Earlier, however, depending on the conceptual map and normative commitments of the writer—in par-
ticular, depending on the author’s position on the connections between God’s law, natural law, positive
law, and morality—legitimate may mean simply lawful (if valid positive law can be at odds with natural
law or morality); simply rightful (if morality can be at odds with valid positive law); lawful because right-
ful (if valid law simply is the natural law); or rightful because lawful (if the command of the sovereign
creates moral obligation). Alternatively, the author may be deploying a concept that simply does not dis-
tinguish lawful from rightful. 
We should not, however, be too quick to suppose that early modern writers divided their conceptual space
in ways that are distant from ours.17 The source of any strangeness may be closer to the surface, in a dif-
ferent account of the content of and criteria for recognizing legal and moral rights and duties. For exam-
ple, the king’s prerogative to contravene common and statutory law was defended by Stuart absolutists in
two ways, which showed two different ways of understanding the connection between valid law and legit-
imacy. On one account, the king’s exercise of his prerogative was legitimate because it was lawful, since
the King’s command made new law; on another account, the King’s prerogative was the legitimate exer-
cise of an extralegal power, which morally overrode, but did not become, the law.18 This intramural 
disagreement among royal absolutists is best understood as substantive, not conceptual. There is a dif-
ference between the view that legitimate simply means lawful and the view that the necessary and suffi- 81
“The connection between actual
political rule and rightful politi-
cal rule has of course always
been a central question in
political philosophy.…”
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cient condition for being legitimate is this other property, lawfulness. If we fail to make this distinction,
we are liable to misinterpret the thought of the writer.
The earliest work I have found that uses “legitimacy” as the primary normative term of art by which to
evaluate rulers is the Huguenot book Vindiciae, contra tyrannos, published in 1579 but probably written
around 1575. The weight of recent scholarship attributes this justification of resistance to tyranny to
Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (1549-1623), a young Protestant aristocrat who served Henry of Navarre as a
military officer, diplomat, and counselor—though authorship may have been shared with his older and
more scholarly friend Hubert Languet (1518-1581).19 Written in the aftermath of the St. Bartholomew’s
Day Massacres of 1572, the Vindiciae is the most developed and the most influential of the French
Protestant works of political thought that address the question of justified resistance. It is not all that
original — that distinction goes to François Hotman’s Francogallia or Théodore Beza’s Right of
Magistrates. But unlike Hotman, Beza, or the major absolutist writer of the day, Bodin, the Vindiciae,
beginning with its subtitle, “Concerning the legitimate power [legitima potestate] of a prince over the 
people, and of the people over the prince,” repeatedly deploys the term “legitimacy” as a normative 
property of rulers that doesn’t simply mean legality or procedural correctness.
The term legitimacy also comes down to us with the sense that Edmund the bastard rails against: proper birth.
A legitimate child is a child born of a lawful marriage. Almost all instances of legitimus in medieval scholar-
ship on Roman law concern the laws of inheritance. In a world where kings are the lawful rulers and the
firstborn legitimate son ordinarily is the proper successor to the throne, political legitimacy can seem to be
inextricably a matter of pedigree or procedure, a property of rulers who are not bastard kings. Commentators
on Lear often point out that Edmund confuses primogeniture with bastardy when he complains,
… Wherefore should I
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit
The curiosity of nations to deprive me
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moon-shines
Lag of a brother? 
But Edmund is not confused—he is taking aim, not merely at the status of natural children in England,
but at pedigreed conceptions of political legitimacy in the customary law of nations. Edmund doesn’t sim-
ply want to be acknowledged. He wants to rule.
In commenting on the 2000 election, William F. Buckley captures (and lampoons) the sensibility that
ties political legitimacy too tightly to paternity:
Nevermind, for the moment, whether the true Florida count will be ascertainable. … What
can be generated here is a mood: Is that man really the father of that child? … Did “the peo-
ple” really bear George W. Bush as president? … What is raised is the question of legitimacy
as rising from the loins of “the people”: the ultimate mystique of self-government, the tran-
substantiation of the single voter who, begetting a majority, creates a legitimate government.20
You can almost hear the irony of Edmund. “Fine word, legitimate!”
I propose to check lawfulness and pedigree, the two pieces of conceptual baggage just discussed, at the
door. The connections, if any, between legitimate rule, lawful rule, and pedigreed rulers are not concep-
tually necessary—they are not built into the very idea of legitimacy. Rather, such connections are features82
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of particular conceptions of legitimacy—the content and criteria of the concept—that must be estab-
lished through substantive moral argument. The concept of legitimacy—in our rough draft, the moral
right to rule—puts fewer constraints on possible conceptions than one might at first think.
When I claim that a ruler is legitimate just in case he is God’s anointed, and you claim a ruler is legiti-
mate just in case she is freely and fairly elected under the provisions of a liberal constitution, we disagree
about the criteria for having moral legitimacy, but we agree, roughly, about what the disagreement is
about. Unlike with riverbanks and money banks, we are not talking past each other.
The concept itself makes no essential reference to a procedure or
to pedigree, so “a government is morally legitimate if and only if
it is morally good” is a possible conception. Edmund offers anoth-
er possible substantive conception: “Why bastard? Wherefore
base?/ when my dimensions are as well compact,/my mind as
generous, and my shape as true/as honest madam’s issue?” Why
are you reaching for pedigreed criteria for political legitimacy? Look at me! I’ve got all these fine features.
Why shouldn’t the right to rule follow from the qualities of the ruler, rather than his origins? 
But neither does the concept make an essential reference to substantive goodness, justness, or all-
things-considered moral correctness. Possible conceptions of legitimacy can refer exclusively to an
authoritative text, or a line of familial descent, or the enactments of a legislative body. Particular con-
ceptions of legitimacy might specify either some procedure or some substantive attribute or both as
necessary or sufficient conditions. 
Moral legitimacy is usefully distinguished from two other concepts, justice, on the one hand, and legal
validity, on the other. On some conceptions, these concepts are coextensive: one could hold the view that a
law is valid if and only if it is morally legitimate, and one could hold that a law is morally legitimate if and
only if it is substantively just. But the three concepts pick out three different properties that a law can have.
The most plausible conceptions, I believe, require both a sufficiently close connection between the rulers
and the ruled and the protection of at least a short list of basic substantive rights and liberties. Perhaps
governments that aren’t fully democratic and fully liberal can be legitimate, but not governments that are
tyrannical or that violate fundamental human rights. This, however, is a normative conception, and so
something I will need to argue for. 
The concept of valid law makes no essential reference to moral justification. The concept of valid law
refers simply to the institutional fact of the matter of what counts as the law for those who are subject
to it. If validity is an institutional fact, it depends on shared understandings. It is quite plausible to
suppose that cultures would include a shared understanding of moral legitimacy as a condition of legal
validity, even if such a condition is not a formal requirement for having a shared understanding about
valid law. But what a culture considers to be morally legitimate is not, by itself, morally legitimate.
Cultural understandings about moral legitimacy can be mistaken. Recall the earlier distinction
between perceived legitimacy and consent. It may be a social fact about a people that their laws are
valid only if widely believed to be legitimate, and they may in fact believe their laws to be legitimate,
and yet their laws, though valid, may fail to be legitimate.21
One could argue that built into the very concept of legal validity is the claim of moral legitimacy, or
beliefs about moral legitimacy. This may be so, but neither the claim of moral legitimacy by rulers nor 83
“ What more can we expect of political
actors than that the best method of
decision be employed?”
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the belief by the ruled that this claim succeeds get you all the way to moral legitimacy, for such claims
and beliefs can be mistaken. 
On particular conceptions of legal validity, laws are valid only if they are morally legitimate, or only if they
are just. But valid law doesn’t simply mean morally legitimate law or just law. A natural lawyer and a legal
positivist disagree about what counts as valid law, but they agree about what they are disagreeing about.
If the Kosovo Report is mistaken, and there is no wedge to be driven between legality and legitimacy, it’s
not a conceptual error that Justice Goldstone has made. To defeat the Kosovo Report, one has to provide
a moral argument. If Richard Gephardt errs in saying that George W. Bush, though legal, is not legiti-
mate, it is not a conceptual error. To show that Gephardt is mistaken, one has to provide a moral argu-
ment to demonstrate that the content of legitimacy is not what he says it is.
Consider a common objection to accounts of legitimacy that include substantive criteria. There is no
alternative to relying on some procedure or another, under the jurisdiction of some institution or anoth-
er, to decide whether political practices are legitimate, so procedural legitimacy is conceptually prior to
substantive legitimacy. Constitutions need to be adopted and amended, legislation enacted, and legal
cases decided by some procedure. When Supreme Court justices disagree on the substance of law, they
settle their disagreements by a procedure—majority rule.22
This objection confuses methods for achieving legitimacy and criteria of legitimacy. Of course, as a prag-
matic matter, political decisions need to be made one way or another, by some actors or others, and some
ways of making decisions by some actors are more likely than other ways by other actors to result in laws
and policies that satisfy the criteria of legitimacy. What more can we expect of political actors than that
the best method of decision be employed? Perhaps nothing more, but that is consistent with the possi-
bility of failure: the best method for achieving legitimacy can still misfire. This is so for any account of
legitimacy that isn’t purely procedural—that is, any account that doesn’t claim that legitimacy just is
whatever the result of a proper procedure happens to be. But though there is much to be said for hypo-
thetical pure proceduralism in moral philosophy, it is question-begging to assume that actual pure pro-
ceduralism is a conceptually necessary test of legitimacy. Now, something important may follow from the
observation that, ex ante, the most that we can demand of political actors is that they follow the correct
procedures and employ the best methods of decision. They may be immune from blame or criticism of
a certain sort. Their mistakes may be owed some measure of respect. But it does not follow that their mis-
takes are owed obedience or are immune from interference. 
A perspicuous way to put this point borrows a distinction made by Nomy Arpaly in a different context.23
There is a difference between the contents of a user’s manual for an intendedly legitimate actor and a the-
ory of legitimacy containing necessary and sufficient conditions for legitimate action. Critics of the sub-
stantive conception of legitimacy rightly insist that the legitimate actor’s manual necessarily is procedural,
but why would I want to deny this?  Judgments of legitimacy have their primary bite from the second- and
third-person perspectives. From the first-person point of view, one ought to follow not merely the legiti-
mate actor’s manual but the more stringent just actor’s manual. Legitimacy primarily arises as a problem
for moral patients and third-party observers who judge a political action to be unjust. From those per-
spectives, however, the legitimacy of an observed actor can be evaluated on other than procedural grounds.
They can say to the actor, even if it is so that no method other than the one you followed had a better chance
of generating legitimate law, still, you failed to generate legitimate law. Following the best method for pro-
ducing legitimate law doesn’t constitute legitimate law any more than following the best recipe for crème
brûlée constitutes crème brûlée. The proof is in the pudding. The practical upshot of such an evaluation
from the point of view of the second or third party may justify disobedience, resistance, or intervention.84
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IV.  LEGIT IMACY AND L IABIL ITY
Because the concept of legitimacy is thinner than historical usage of the word suggests, there are fewer
conceptual constraints on possible criteria for legitimacy—how one gets it. Similarly, the concept puts
fewer constraints on what legitimacy necessarily gets you—the normative implications of being legiti-
mate. The standard view is that moral legitimacy entails two other normative relations: the moral obliga-
tion of those legitimately ruled by the ruler to obey, and moral immunity of the ruler from coercive
interference in the exercise and enforcement of legitimate rule. On this view, it is incoherent to hold that
an authority is legitimate, but that those subject to the authority are not morally obligated to comply with
its commands, or that others are not morally disabled from stopping the legitimate authority from exer-
cising its legitimate powers. To think that legitimate commands do not necessarily obligate is like think-
ing that parenthood does not necessitate children.
My stance on this claim of incoherence is by now familiar. It is a virtue in conceptual analysis to seek the
least restrictive specification of a concept that is still useful and fruitful, because if we don’t we risk mak-
ing two mistakes. The first is to misdescribe a genuine disagreement as a semantic misunderstanding.
The second is to dismiss rival moral arguments too quickly as logical mistakes. In this case, the dismissal
indeed is too quick. If the exercise of legitimate authority creates moral obligation, this is so for substan-
tive moral reasons. If legitimate authorities have immunity, it is not an analytic truth.
Joseph Raz is the contemporary philosopher who has made the strongest case for a conceptual connection
between legitimate authority and obligation  (though he has not, to my knowledge, taken a stand on immu-
nity).24 Raz has convincingly argued that the exercise of legitimate authority by an actor entails some change
in the normative situation or status of another. Otherwise, having authority cannot be distinguished from
merely having a moral permission to causally affect another. To use one of Raz’s examples, having the lib-
erty to burn rubbish in my backyard despite the objections of my neighbor does not give me legitimate
authority over my neighbor.25 When we invoke legitimate authority, we ascribe to the actor something more
powerful than merely a liberty or privilege. Raz says that this power is the power to obligate.
I think Raz is right that legitimate authority is more powerful than mere permission, and it is a deep
insight of his to recognize that this something more is the power to change the normative situation of
others. But there is one very good reason to hope that there are other ways that legitimate authorities can
change the normative situation of others aside from obligating them, and that reason is civil disobedi-
ence. On Raz’s account, civil disobedience disappears as an important and poignant moral phenomenon.
If legitimate authority entails moral obligation to obey, then civil disobedience against an unjust but legit-
imate authority never is justified. If, by assumption, disobedience is justified, then the authority that is
disobeyed cannot have been legitimate. The Rawlsian account of nonviolent civil disobedience as an ille-
gal practice that nonetheless expresses respect for and fidelity to the laws of a nearly just democratic soci-
ety that has fallen short of its own aspirations is, on Raz’s view, so much tortured sentimentality. When
disobedience is justified, the authority that is disobeyed is not legitimate, is not due respect, and so pre-
sumably is a fair target for even sharper tactics of dissent, such as militant resistance or subversion. There
may be other moral reasons to refrain from sharper tactics, but if any disobedience is justified, respect
for democratic authority is not among those reasons. If, contrary to Raz, you do find civil disobedience
and the conditions that justify it to be an important form of dissent midway between lawful protest and
armed insurrection, then you had better hope that there is someway to drive a wedge between legitimate
authority and moral obligation. The way to drive that wedge is to recognize that the power of a legitimate
authority to change the normative situation of the subject is not necessarily the power to obligate. But
what else can that power be?
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To get at what I think is the correct conceptual account of moral legitimacy, we need to return to the well-
known analytic jurisprudence that Wesley Hohfeld developed early in the twentieth century.26 Hohfeld
distinguished four legal advantages that A can have in relation to B, which, correlatively, entail four legal
disadvantages of B in relation to A. If A has a right (or, more specifically, a claim-right) against B, B has
a correlative duty to A; if A has a privilege (or liberty) with respect to B, B has no-right against A; if A has
a power with respect to B, B faces a liability from A; and if A has an immunity from B, B has a disability
with respect to A. Each legal advantage also has its negation: having a claim-right is the opposite of hav-
ing no-right; a privilege is the opposite of a duty; a power is the opposite of a disability; and an immunity is
the opposite of a liability. Hohfeld’s elegant scheme was formulated to show the connection between legal
concepts, but, with some minor tinkering, it illuminates connections between moral concepts as well: if
A has a moral claim-right against B, then B has a correlative moral duty to honor the claim, and so on.
F I G U R E  1 HOHFELDIAN LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
Right Privilege Power Immunity
Duty No-right Liability Disability
Vertical pairs are correlatives.   Diagonal pairs are opposites.
On my account, legitimacy is a kind of moral power, the power to create and enforce nonmoral (or perhaps I
should say not yet moral) prescriptions and social facts. A legitimate authority has the moral power to author
legal, institutional, or conventional rights and duties, powers and liabilities, which change the legal, institu-
tional, and conventional situation or status of subjects. In what way, though, does the exercise of this moral
power change the moral situation or status of the subject?  If Hohfeld’s scheme is correct, when A exercis-
es a moral power with respect to B, and thereby imposes upon B an institutional duty, then B must have a
correlative moral liability. What is this liability?  It is that B is subject to morally justified enforcement. But
a moral liability is not a moral duty, and an institutional duty is not a moral duty. Raz’s requirement that the
exercise of legitimate authority change the normative situation of the subject of that authority is satisfied
because B now is subject to a moral liability—justified enforcement. It is not conceptually necessary that, if
A exercises legitimate authority in imposing upon B an institutional duty, B has a moral duty to comply. 
F I G U R E  2   THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY
Institutional Duties,
Liabilities…
Institutional Rights,
Powers…
To create, enforce:
Moral Liability 
Moral Liability = Moral Duty
Moral Power = Moral Immunity
Institutional Duty = Moral Duty
Moral Power
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How are we to understand a moral liability that is not yet a moral duty? Note that the opposite of a lia-
bility is an immunity: the subject of legitimate authority has no moral immunity from the imposition of
legal duties and their enforcement, and this limits the sort of justified complaints the subject can make.
When such legal duties are imposed and enforced, the subject can complain that the law is mistaken, stu-
pid, or unfair, but he cannot justifiably complain that the law is an unauthorized abuse of power. He can
complain that he has been wronged in one way, but not in another: if legitimate, this is the sort of mis-
take about right and wrong that is the authority’s to make. As a conceptual matter, a legitimate law need
not be a just law.
Now, it would be quite odd for a lawmaker to defend creating and enforcing an unjust law on the
grounds that it is legitimate. Surely, from the first-personal perspective, I am morally prohibited from
issuing an unjust law, even if I have the legitimate authority to do so. But this shows why legitimacy
is primarily a practical judgment made from the second- and third-person perspective: it governs how
you, the moral patient, should react to my unjust or unwise moral agency, whether lesser officials
should enforce, and whether third parties should intervene. Or, to put it another way, the question of
legitimacy arises when there is disagreement about the justice or goodness of an authority’s com-
mand. Raz holds that to judge an authority legitimate simply is to judge that the subjects of that
authority have a moral duty to obey it. I hold that to judge an authority legitimate simply is to judge
that the subjects of that authority are morally liable—that is, not morally immune—from the imposi-
tion and enforcement of nonmoral duties. Whether they face a moral duty as well remains an open
question. The idea that legitimate authority necessarily creates moral obligation may get its grip in
part from the baggage left over from theological voluntarism, the view that there is no moral obliga-
tion until God creates it by his command. But even if there is no obligation without a commander,
there can be a commander who fails to obligate.
What about the reigning orthodoxy in international law, that a legitimate authority has immunity from
outside intervention?  Again, if Hohfeld’s scheme holds up, having a moral power is not the same as, and
does not entail, having a moral immunity. When A exercises a moral power over B, and imposes upon B
an institutional duty, this imposes upon B a morally justified liability to enforcement, which is the oppo-
site of a moral immunity from enforcement. But just because B lacks moral immunity from A, A does
not have moral immunity from the interference of some third party C. There is no conceptual route from
having legitimacy—having moral power—to having moral immunity. Nor does having legal immunity
under international law entail having moral immunity. These all are connections that will have to be
established by moral argument, not conceptual analysis. 
One such argument is that respect for less-than-just laws, policies, and practices abroad follows from the
respect owed to members of a political community who have collectively decided, in a way collectively
acceptable to them, how to govern themselves. A political community that fails to have just practices may
reasonably claim that the offending practices are still their practices, and that, within bounds, mistakes
about what justice demands are theirs to make. I said within bounds: the bounds are marked by whether
interference would be disrespectful to those who are being treated unjustly—whether it is reasonable for
those most burdened by unjust practices nonetheless to endorse the practices as their own. Surely, if
those burdened correctly held that the burdensome practices imposed upon them genuine moral duties,
outsiders would have no cause to interfere for their sake.27
Recall, however, that legitimate authority to impose an institutional duty does not entail a moral duty to
comply. Governors (or the majority, or the powerful) may be sufficiently connected to the will and inter-
ests of the governed (or the minority, or the weak) to pass the threshold of legitimate authority, but not 87
L
E
G
IT
IM
A
C
Y
IN
A
B
A
S
T
A
R
D
K
IN
G
D
O
M
sufficiently connected to make the burdensome practices the practices of the burdened, and generate in
them genuine moral duties to obey. Contrary to Raz, justified civil disobedience against a legitimate
authority is not an empty category. Unjustly treated minorities can be forgiven if they reject a reified
account of “we” in “We the People” under which their injuries are self-inflicted. When this is so, it shows
no disrespect to them for outsiders to intervene on their behalf. Moral legitimacy and moral immunity
can come apart, moral legitimacy and moral duty can come apart, and therefore duty and immunity can
stand and fall together. When oppressed minorities and dissenters aren’t morally obligated to obey unjust
but legitimate authority, outsiders aren’t morally disabled from helpful meddling on their behalf. What
forms of meddling are morally permitted are shaped and constrained by the respect owed to an unjust
but legitimate regime by outsiders, but it isn’t at all clear why this should be any greater than the respect
owed by unjustly burdened insiders.
V.  WHAT IF  EVERYONE DID WHAT?
With Hohfeld’s help—in particular, by contrasting Hohfeldian legal relationships with moral ones—we
now can interpret and evaluate the Goldstone Commission’s claim that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,
though illegal, was legitimate. Milosevic’s Yugoslavia claimed the legal power to impose binding legal
duties on the Kosovars, who had no legal right of resistance. Under international law, Yugoslavia had
standing as a sovereign state immune from intervention. NATO’s member states are bound by interna-
tional law—or, to put it in a more cumbersome but precise way, international law has the power to
impose duties and other legal disadvantages on states, and one such disadvantage is that states are legal-
ly disabled from intervening in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.
When subjected to even minimally demanding criteria of moral legitimacy, however, Milosevic’s
Yugoslavia fails miserably. Having amply demonstrated their capacity for slaughter, rape, and ethnic
cleansing on a grand scale in Bosnia, Serb nationalists had begun operations in Kosovo. The Kosovars
were deprived of their most basic political freedoms and faced massive human rights violations. It would
be perverse to maintain the fiction that the Milosevic regime impersonated the will or protected the basic
interests of its Kosovar citizens. Surely the Kosovars had the moral right to defend themselves. But did
the United States and other member states of NATO have the moral right to intervene on their behalf?
If the United States is subject to legitimate international law that immunizes Yugoslavia against inter-
ference, and if Raz is correct that legitimate authority entails moral obligation, then the answer is no. For
the answer to be yes, either the international law that grants Yugoslavia immunity must not be legitimate,
or Raz must be mistaken. Of the three claims—(1) NATO’s intervention to prevent massive human rights
violations in Kosovo was morally permitted, (2) international law prohibiting such intervention is legiti-
mate, and (3) legitimacy entails obligation—at most two can hold. I am more sure of the truth of (1) than
I am of anything else in this paper, even if that requires giving up (2). But one does not need to give up
(2) if one gives up (3) in favor of the moral liability view of legitimacy.
On the moral liability view, international law, insofar as it is legitimate, is a kind of moral power to cre-
ate and enforce nonmoral legal obligations, and this entails that those subject to these legal obligations
face moral liability, but not necessarily moral obligation. So the Hohfeldian picture of the moral rela-
tionships looks like this: Milosevic has no legitimate moral power over the Kosovars, and the Kosovars
have no moral duties to the Yugoslav regime. Yugoslavia has no moral immunity from intervention, and
outsiders are not morally disabled from aiding the Kosovars. Insofar as international bodies such as the
United Nations are legitimate, they have the moral power to create nonmoral legal rules, and states that
are subject to those rules are morally liable to enforcement, sanction, or censure. But, by analogy to88
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domestic civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, conditions can be specified under which an actor
is morally justified in violating such rules.28 When those conditions are met, it does not follow that the
law that is justifiably violated is illegitimate law. 
Specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for justified disobedi-
ence of legitimate international law is a task for another time; here I will
simply assert that protecting a large civilian population from massacre, sys-
tematic rape, and massive dislocation will easily meet any plausible test of
justified disobedience. How international conventions that legally prohibit
such intervention can meet the test of legitimate law is not so easily sup-
posed in the absence of a well-worked-out normative theory of interna-
tional law, which I do not have. But any normative theory of legitimate law,
municipal or international, will need to acknowledge the irreducible asym-
metry between the perspective of the legislator whose task is to frame an ex
ante institutional rule that anticipates bad judgment and bad will and the
perspective of the agent exercising principled moral judgment ex post. One
way that space for justified disobedience of legitimate law opens up is in the
gap between these two perspectives. 
Failure to appreciate the difference between institutional rules and moral principles is at the bottom of a
lot of ill-considered legal and moral reasoning. Consider this non sequitur by U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan, made in the years between Srebrenica and Kosovo:
Can we really afford to let each state be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in
another state’s internal conflict?  If we do, will we not be forced to legitimize Hitler’s cham-
pionship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? 29
Now, it is unclear whether the judgments, rights, duties, and legitimization in question here are moral
or legal, but on any construal, the answer to the second question is a resounding No! Each state’s judg-
ing its own right or duty (whether legal or moral) is consistent with objective standards for such judg-
ments, and a state that fails to properly meet those standards, either mistakenly or willfully, can be in turn
judged (whether legally or morally) and held to account. An individual judging her right to use force in
self-defense, a manufacturer judging its right to impose reasonable risks on consumers, a legislature
judging its right to enact constitutionally questionable legislation all are subject to judgment for the exer-
cise of judgment. Does Kofi Annan think that if a person being mugged has the right to defend herself
without obtaining a court order first, every claim of self-defense, no matter how groundless, must be
accepted on its face?  
Now, there may indeed be good reasons to have an international rule that says: 
R1. “No state may intervene in another state’s internal conflict without the explicit approval
of the UN Security Council,”
and this rule may have advantages over alternative rules, such as: 
R2. “No state may intervene in another state’s internal conflict except to prevent imminent
humanitarian disaster and only when peaceful means have no reasonable chance of success.”
“Here I will simply assert that 
protecting a large civilian 
population from massacre, 
systematic rape, and massive 
dislocation will easily meet 
any plausible test of justified 
disobedience.”
L
E
G
IT
IM
A
C
Y
IN
A
B
A
S
T
A
R
D
K
IN
G
D
O
M
But it is obvious that R2 does not legitimize Hitler’s armed robbery of Czechoslovakia or the Soviet’s
imperial misadventure in Afghanistan, any more than R1 legitimizes a claim that the Security Council
approved some action when in fact it did not. Any criterion can be invoked disingenuously. The empiri-
cal prediction that a criterion will be invoked and misapplied disingenuously or mistakenly, and that mis-
application will lead to bad consequences, counts against writing that criterion into a rule. If, predictably,
more unjustified acts of aggression will occur under R2 than under R1, that is a reason to enact R1. But
if, predictably, fewer justified humanitarian interventions will occur under R1 than under R2, that is a rea-
son to enact R2. Either way, we are never "forced to legitimize" the exercise of judgment by a state, if the
phrase means something like disabled from challenging the legitimacy of a state’s actions.
Multilateralists sometimes talk as if unilateralists are guilty of a practical contradiction, as if unilateralists
are proposing a maxim that fails the test of universalizability. But as typically invoked, the "What if every-
one did it?" objection confuses moral principles with institutional rules. True, a candidate for a moral prin-
ciple that fails the test of universalizability fails as a moral principle. But the proper retort to the objection
“What if everyone did it?” is “What if everyone did what?” Without contradiction, one can put forward cri-
teria for unilateral, extralegal intervention that do universalize, are not simply self-dealing, and wouldn’t be
self-defeating if other state actors did the same, where “doing the same” is acting in accordance with pre-
cisely those criteria. It is no embarrassment to a correctly formulated moral principle that disaster would
result if others acted on some different, incorrectly formulated principle, either through error or cynicism.
Moral reasoning is paralyzed if one’s commitment to the soundness of a moral argument is undermined
by the fact that one’s argument could be misunderstood, misapplied, and misused by others.
In contrast with moral principles, the bad consequences of incorrect interpretation and misapplication do
count against an institutional rule (just as the unavoidable overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of
correct interpretation and application counts for and against a particular formulation of an institutional
rule).30 But the way these considerations count is through their empirical consequences, not through some
hypothetical generalization. One asks the empirical question, "Will the promulgation and enforcement of
this formulation of the rule predictably lead to more serious misapplications than some other formulation
of the rule?" and not the hypothetical question "What if everyone misapplied the rule?"  Institutional rules
requiring multilateralism and those permitting unilateralism are held to the same empirical test.
What is properly subjected to a universalizability test is one’s specification of the moral criteria that gov-
ern when actors are morally permitted (or required) to disobey institutional rules in order to defend
human rights. Once the necessary conceptual link between the legitimate authority of law and the moral
obligation to obey is broken, whether there is such a specification and, if so, what it contains becomes an
open moral question settled by moral argument and judgment. Appeals to authority obviously will not
settle questions about the moral powers of that same authority, and since it is authority all the way up, it
is judgment all the way down. This, in his way, is what Edmund told us at the start: 
Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound.
*  *  *  *
This account of the concept of legitimacy and the range of its possible conceptions has taken us quite
some distance from the standard view adopted by most social scientists and lawyers. Consider, for an
illustrative and striking contrast, the definition of legitimacy offered by the international legal scholar
Thomas Franck:90
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Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or
institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles
of right process.31
Legitimacy for Franck is the property of a rule that motivates a perception of obligation because of a belief
in proper pedigree or procedure. I reject Franck’s account at every step. The account of legitimacy that I
have presented makes the following claims:
1 Normative legitimacy is conceptually prior to descriptive legitimacy, and it is a con-
fusion to think that legitimacy simply means beliefs about legitimacy. The source of 
this fairly recent but endemic error can be traced to sloppy readings of Max Weber.
2 The idea of legitimacy is conceptually distinct from the idea of legality. Any connec-
tion between law and legitimacy is a matter for substantive moral argument, not 
conceptual analysis. This is so despite the etymology and early senses of the word 
legitimacy and its cognates. 
3 The idea of legitimacy is not essentially tied to notions of procedure or pedigree. This 
too is a matter for substantive moral argument, not conceptual analysis. This is so 
despite the linguistic and historical association of illegitimacy with bastardy.
4 Legitimacy is a moral power that entails moral liability, but it does not entail moral 
obligation, and it does not entail immunity. This is so despite the baggage left behind 
by theological voluntarism and its secular successors. The connections between legit-
imacy, obligation, and immunity must be established by normative argument, not 
conceptual analysis.
5 Responsibility for judging whether claimed legitimate authority is genuine or not can-
not be avoided. Any appeal to higher authority simply pushes the inquiry back a step. 
Similarly, responsibility for judging whether a legitimate authority may nonetheless be 
disobeyed cannot be avoided. The answer to the question “Who is to say?” ultimately is 
“You are to say.” Moral reasoning requires judgment all the way down.
The ground is now prepared for a normative conception of legitimacy that:
1 Is conditioned in part on satisfying substantive criteria for the treatment of those 
subject to rule;
2 Underwrites the legitimacy of a substantive liberal constitution implemented in part 
by countermajoritarian institutions;
3 Contains a robust account of justified civil disobedience of legitimate municipal law;
4 Contains a robust account of justified governmental disobedience of legitimate inter-
national law.
The development of this normative conception of legitimacy is the task ahead.
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NOTE
Versions of this paper have been presented in the General Aspects of Law seminar at Boalt Hall, University of California,
Berkeley; the Legal Theory Workshop at Yale Law School; the Legal Ethics Institute at Washington and Lee University
School of Law; and as the Gross Memorial Lecture at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.  Support for this project
has been provided by the Center for Ethics and the Professions and the Center for Public Leadership at Harvard
University. Copyright © 2004 by Arthur Isak Applbaum.
ENDNOTES
1 Shakespeare, William. King Lear (1606), I:2
2 Lear I:I
3 For a chilling hour-by-hour reconstruction of these shameful events, see David Rohde, Endgame (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 1997). 
4 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10.
5 Kosovo Report, 290.
6 Or rather, the Commission held that the illegality of the campaign was straightforward, which is all that is needed
here. Some have argued that the Kosovo intervention made new international law. I do not have a considered view
about how new international law is made, except on a point that I hope is not controversial: if international law sim-
ply is whatever international bodies do, then such “law” is not recognizably law-like, because it does not guide or
constrain prospective action.
7 Kosovo Report, 288-89.
8 Meet the Press [television show]. December 17, 2000.
9 Bush v Gore I, 531 U.S. 1047 (December 9, 2000), Stevens, J. dissenting; citation omitted. 
10 Bush v Gore I, 531 U.S. 1046 (December 9, 2000), Scalia, J. concurring.
11 Bush v Gore II, 531 U.S. 157 (December 12, 2000), Breyer, J. dissenting.
12 Brownstein, R. (2000 December 17). The presidential transition; Bush has legitimacy, but it’s fragile. The Los
Angeles Times, p. A1. 
13 Weber, Max. Economy and society (c. 1920). 1968. Guenther Roth (Ed.). Vol. I, chap. III.1,  213. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
14 “There are three pure types of legitimate domination. The validity of the claims to legitimacy may be based on
1. Rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority
under such rules to issue commands (legal authority [legale Herrschaft])
2. Traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy
of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority [traditionale Herrschaft]); or finally,
3. Charismatic grounds—resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an indi-
vidual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority [charis-
matische Herrschaft]).”  Weber, vol. I, chap. III.2, 215.
93
L
E
G
IT
IM
A
C
Y
IN
A
B
A
S
T
A
R
D
K
IN
G
D
O
M
15 See, for example, the royally mandated instructional text, God and the King: or, a Dialogue shewing that our Soveraigne
Lord King James, being immediate under God within his Dominions, Doth rightfully claime whatsoever is required by
the Oath of Allegeance (1615). It teaches that the King has no superior besides God, the bond of allegiance from his
subjects is inviolable, and neither tyranny, infidelity, heresy, apostacy, or acts of the pope can dissolve it.
16 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. The social contract. I:1.
17 Many years ago, I was taught that Buddhism was utterly transformed when it migrated from India to China because
the Chinese had no word for zero, and so could not conceive of nothingness. I thought this profound, perhaps
because a sophomore lacks the concept of sophomoric. But consider:  Mei-Mei has two rice bowls. She gives one
to Ching and another to Chang. How many rice bowls are left in Mei-Mei’s head?
18 Sommerville, J.P. 1986. Politics and ideology in England, 1603-1640. London: Longman.
19 More ink has been spilled on attributing all or parts of the Vindiciae than in assessing it as a work of political phi-
losophy. Skinner definitively gives it to Mornay. See Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought,
vol. II, 305 (Cambridge University Press, 1978). Garnett, who prepared the excellent and painstaking contemporary
translation, concludes that the work most likely is the result of close collaboration with Languet. See Stephanus
Junius Brutus, the Celt (pseud.), Vindiciae, contra tyrannos: or, concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the
people, and of the people over a prince (1579). George Garnett (Ed.). (Cambridge University Press, 1994), lxxvi.
20 Buckley, William F. (2000 December 2). Be skeptical about Bush ‘illegitimacy.’ The Houston Chronicle, p. A42.
21 Applbaum, Arthur Isak. 1999. Cultural convention and legitimate law, Chicago Kent Law Review, 74:2, 615-24.
22 This objection is at the core of Jeremy Waldron’s critique of Ronald Dworkin’s defense of the legitimacy of counter-
majoritarian institutions and practices such as judicial review. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and disagreement (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1999).
23 See Nomy Arpaly, On acting rationally against one’s best judgment, Ethics 110:488 (2000), where she distinguishes
between a manual for rational actors and a theory of rationality.
24 See Joseph Raz, The authority of law (Oxford, 1979), and The morality of freedom (Oxford, 1986).
25 The morality of freedom, 24.
26 Wesley Necomb Hohfeld’s work is collected in Fundamental legal conceptions as applied to judicial reasoning (Yale, 1919).
27 This, I think, is how to avoid the unappealing conclusion that Rawls’s Law of Peoples requires liberal societies to
be deaf to the cries of unjustly treated minorities inside illiberal but decent hierarchical societies. Among the
requirements for a decent society are that its laws impose bona fide moral obligations on its subjects, that basic
human rights, including some measure of liberty of conscience, be secured, and that the society be well-ordered,
meaning that it be stable for the right reasons. Now, since Rawls clearly rejects moral relativism, exactly how law
that is unjust is supposed to generate genuine moral obligation in decent societies isn’t clear, but it must have
something to do with nearly universal and genuine endorsement of the illiberal conception of justice in that soci-
ety sufficient to reproduce that conception from one generation to the next without resort to repression (which is
ruled out by the requirements of human rights, liberty of conscience, and stability for the right reasons). But if
these conditions are all satisfied, the unjustly treated will not be crying out to liberal ears—not because they have
been silenced or brainwashed, but because they (mistakenly but reasonably in light of the burdens of judgment
applicable across cultures) do not consider their treatment to be unjust, or they (perhaps correctly, or perhaps mis-
takenly but reasonably) do not consider their treatment sufficiently unjust to justify illegal activity. Conversely, an
illiberal society that has a significant minority crying out for help from liberal quarters doesn’t meet the criteria of
94
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
  
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 F
O
R
 P
U
B
L
IC
 L
E
A
D
E
R
S
H
IP
a decent hierarchical society, and so wouldn’t be immune from interference. Other readers of Rawls might 
reasonably (but mistakenly) take my reading to be too charitable.
28 There are important disanalogies too—perhaps the most important that we are here contemplating is the use of 
violence, and violence is constitutive of a rejection of legitimacy. But note that the target of violence here is
Milosevic’s regime, not the United Nations. If, counterfactually, the only way to save Srebrenica were to attack the
U.N. peacekeepers, such a strike would be incompatible with the view that the U.N. had legitimate authority in
Srebrenica. The general point is that tactics of dissent express views about the authority that is resisted, and so the
justification of dissent will depend in part on a proper match with the normative status of the authority. Civil dis-
obedience in a nearly just democracy requires tactics that, by appealing to the sense of justice of the mistaken
majority, express sufficient respect for one’s fellow citizens. Tyrants are owed no such respect. 
The practical importance of this expressive quality of resistance arose with resistance theory itself in the late six-
teenth century. It is possible that a critical turning point in the history of modernity depended on the outcome of a
political philosophy seminar on this topic held at Montaigne’s chateau—no doubt over excellent Sauternes—the
night of October 23, 1587. After Henri of Navarre’s brilliant defeat of a Catholic army at the Battle of Coutras a cou-
ple of days before, the Protestant heir presumptive to the French throne baffled expectations by not pressing his
advantage. The resistance theory of Mornay, Navarre’s closest adviser, would have justified a decisive campaign: in
an obvious allusion to the Guise family’s dominance in the Valois court, the Vindiciae pointedly considered courtiers
who in effect usurp power from a properly titled but weak ruler to be tyrants in title. But after spending a night at
Montaigne’s chateau, Navarre withdrew his forces from the field and tarried for a month with his mistress.
Corisande’s domestic charms do not completely account for this turn. A better (though speculative) explanation is
that Montaigne, a tolerant and politique Catholic, persuaded Navarre that pressing on would signal open rebellion
against the rule of King Henri III, and this would contradict Navarre’s own understanding that he was protector of
the Protestant minority, but loyal to the king. Navarre took Montaigne’s counsel—perhaps over Mornay’s objections,
and perhaps heeding letters from Corisande, whose mentor was none other than Montaigne. Although Navarre’s
restraint resulted in an inconclusive end to the eighth war of religion, the “War of the Three Henries” (the duke of
Guise was also a Henri), it helped secure the loyalty and trust of a critical portion of moderate Catholics when
Navarre claimed the throne as Henri IV after Henri III died childless two years later. It isn’t entirely fanciful to say
that political philosophical reflection on the expressive meaning of resistance influenced Navarre’s restraint after
Coutras, and this restraint was a critical moment in the establishment of religious tolerance as a political principle.
29 Annan, Kofi. 1998. Secretary-General reflects on ‘intervention’ in thirty-fifth annual Ditchley Foundation lecture.
United Nations Press Release SG/SM/6613, June 26. To be fair, I must stress that Annan’s lecture is a forceful
defense of intervention in a state’s internal affairs in cases of extreme violation of human rights—but only on the
authority of the U.N. Security Council.
30 Rules, as Schauer has convincingly argued, are to be understood as entrenched generalizations, and so are neces-
sarily overinclusive or underinclusive with respect to their underlying justifications, even when properly interpreted
and applied. See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the rules (Oxford, 1991). Moral principles are generalizations too,
but not entrenched generalizations. If a piece of moral reasoning pitched at a certain level of generality does not
accord with our considered judgments about particular cases, that puts pressure on the specification or ordering of
moral principles that gave the discordant answer, and consistency demands that something give: we either revise
the specification or ordering of our principles, or our judgment about particular cases. So, it is always an embar-
rassment to a candidate for a moral principle that, when correctly applied, it gives the wrong answer, but it is never
an embarrassment to the correct moral principle that, when incorrectly applied, it gives the wrong answer. It needn’t
be an embarrassment to an institutional rule that, when correctly applied, it gives the wrong answer, and it some-
times is an embarrassment to an institutional rule that, when incorrectly applied, it gives the wrong answer. 
31 Franck, Thomas M. 1990. The power of legitimacy among nations. Oxford. 24.
